An important question is whether philosophical hermeneutics is fundamentally capable of promoting knowledge of the principles of jurisprudence. In other words, if we assume that the principles of jurisprudence require more refinement than the new needs of jurisprudence, can philosophical hermeneutics play a radical role in this way? Some religious intellectuals in the Islamic world have given a positive answer to this question, and even have considered philosophical hermeneutics to be the only option. But careful scientific research shows that keeping the current goals for the principles of jurisprudence is never possible. Because there are divergences between the principles of jurisprudence and philosophical hermeneutics in the main pillars of the interpretive apparatus, which exclude the scientific possibility of this influence and limit the influence to only a few local adaptations. One of the major points of contention that is the focus of this paper is on the issue of meaning. However, in any school of interpretation, interpretation is considered to be the core of the meaning of "meaning," because achieving meaning is what the purpose of any school of interpretation is. Principles define meaning in the context of the subject, but philosophical hermeneutists seek to find a meaning that is of an ontological nature (with a particular phenomenological view). Thus, in the most important part of the paradigm, there is no shared paradigm between the two interpretive schools so that they can be rooted in one another, preserving each one's original identity.