Muḥaqiq Irākī, Martyr al-Sadr, and Mirza Jawad al-Tabrizi (May God bless them and grant them peace) have said that the principle of al- Istiṣḥāb (i.e. presumption of continuity of previous state) does not apply to the conceptual doubts in the matter. Each of these scholars provided evidence for their claim, and we have proved them wrong and said while discussing the arguments presented by Muḥaqiq Iraki and Martyr al-Sadr, that their arguments are not complete inasmuch as the elements of Istiṣḥāb are not existing all together, because the subject in the sources of conceptual doubt is the customary understanding of the statement, not the reality itself whereas what is apparent from a speech such as “Throw stones at the al-Jamara al-ʿaqaba during the day” is that the subject of the ruling is the action that is supposed to take place during the daytime as mentioned in the speech.
Hence, we said that the conceptual generality in the specifier (al-mukhaṣiṣ) applies to the generality of the evidence, and contrary to what Martyr al-Ṣadr argues, there is no difference between the generality in the manifestation and that of the concept.  The principle, when applied to an individual case, is not applied independently of the Istiṣḥāb of the general (kullī) from the second category (al-qism al-thānī), rather it is the same Istiṣḥāb the general the second category in reality. When it comes to doubt concerning the cloak (al-shubha al-ʿabāʾiyya), there is no technical prohibition in adhering to the purity of the thing that comes in contact with impurity of the second object which is impure. The result of the research, on the basis of the topic being the usual understanding of the statement, is that the pillars of istiṣḥāb are complete and there is no problem with istiṣḥāb during the day. However, there is another problem in the clear statement, which is that the letter “the” in “Do not invalidate the certainty with doubt” can be used for a specific certainty, so the evidence for istiṣḥāb is limited to the case of doubt in purity from impurity, and does not apply to anything else. Hence, istiṣḥāb in conceptual doubts is not applicable according to this objection (ishkāl).