One of the discussions related to ʿām (general) is the discussion concerning specification (takhṣīṣ) in many cases. The specification of what is general has been taken into consideration in many cases because generally people do not expect a large number of its subsets to leave the general category for any reason after hearing a general word from the speaker. Such an embedded expectation has caused scholars and jurists to adopt sometimes different positions regarding the permissibility and impermissibility of specification of the majority in situations where the specification of the majority is necessary. Also, in the cases where the specification of the majority becomes inevitably reprehensible.  Since the specification of the majority is sometimes not realized in terms of the types related to the specification, but in terms of the manifestations of that specifier, it is necessary to clarify the criteria for the reprehensibility (istihjān) of the specification of the majority, whether or not the reprehensibility is in terms of the types or manifestations of the specifier. The question is, what is this quality of reprehensibility that makes us say takhṣīṣ al-akthar is not possible? Does such a principle even exist? If it does, who says there is a problem with it? If this takhṣīṣ is so obvious and apparent and clear, why is it a problem? Is it rationally impossible? There is no independent discussion on this principle in the books of Uṣūl al-Fiqh, but you can find traces of it in discussions regarding the principle of Lā Ḍarar. In this article, which relies on library resources and has been done in the collection of information in a computer form around the intended goals, the result that is obtained regarding the permissibility or obscenity of the specification of the majority is that if there is a rational point in the specification, it can be a license for it. And we also come to the conclusion that obscenity or reprehensibility is a criterion in terms of title. Also, the criterion presented in the true and external propositions is different and does not follow the same pattern.